We study a market model in which competing …rms use costly marketing devices to in ‡uence the set of alternatives that boundedly rational consumers perceive as relevant. Consumers in our model apply well-de…ned preferences to a "consideration set", which is a subset of the feasible set and subject to manipulation by …rms. We examine the implications of this behavioral model on otherwise competitive markets. In our model, the market equilibrium outcome is not competitive, yet …rms earn competitive payo¤s because the strategic use of costly marketing devices wears o¤ the collusive impact of consumers'bounded rationality. Equilibrium behavior satis…es an "e¤ective marketing property": if a consumer considers a …rm only because of a marketing device it employs, he ends up buying from that …rm.
Introduction
We present a model of competitive marketing based on the notion that consumers are boundedly rational and that marketing interferes with their decision process. The standard model of consumer behavior assumes that the consumer has a clear perception of what is desirable (captured by the preference relation) and a clear perception of what is feasible, taking into account informational constraints (captured by the choice set). Our model retains the assumption that consumers have stable preferences, while relaxing the assumption that they perfectly perceive what is feasible, thus allowing …rms to manipulate that perception. Our objective is to examine the implication of this departure from the standard model on the nature of competition between …rms, and on the role that marketing plays in such competitive environments.
The cornerstone of our model is the observation that in the modern marketplace, consumers face an overwhelmingly large variety of products and therefore often use screening criteria (deliberate as well as unconscious) in order to reduce the number of "relevant"alternatives. As a result, consumers apply their preferences not to the set of objectively feasible alternatives, but to a potentially smaller set which they construct at an earlier stage of the decision process. Borrowing a term from the marketing literature, we refer to this set as the "consideration set" (see Roberts and Lattin (1997) ). For a rational consumer, there is no distinction between the consideration set and the feasible set. However, for a boundedly rational consumer, the consideration set may be a strict subset of the feasible set, either because he is unaware of certain products or because he is unconvinced that they are relevant to his decision problem.
For concreteness, imagine a store manager who wishes to get potential customers into the store. Once a customer is inside, he can survey the products on display and if he …nds something better than his outside option, he will purchase it at the store. But how would the manager get the customer into the store in the …rst place? He may put on display a product that possesses features which, quite independently of their intrinsic consumption value, are good at attracting attention. 1 Alternatively, the manager may try to persuade the customer that there is a good reason for him to enter the store -speci…cally, that the products sold at the store are superior to the customer's outside option according to some criterion (terms of payment, extended warranties, an aspect of quality). In both cases, it may well be that after giving serious consideration to the products sold at the store, the customer will conclude that he prefers his outside option after all. However, in order to bring the customer to the point where he actually exercises his preferences, the store manager had to employ some "door opening"marketing technique.
We construct a simple model of consumer choice that incorporates the idea that an important preliminary phase in consumers' decision process is the formation of consideration sets, and that consequently, employing marketing techniques to in ‡uence the consideration set is a major aspect of …rms'competitive behavior. In our model, a choice problem is a pair (M; s), where M is a menu of products and s is a product that serves as a "reference point". The consumer's choice procedure is based on two primitives: a standard preference relation % and another binary relation R, called the "consideration relation". The relation yRx means that the consumer is willing to consider y at x. The consumers'choice procedure consists of two stages. In the …rst stage, he constructs a consideration set, which is M [ fsg if xRs for some x 2 M , and fsg otherwise. (Figuratively put, when the consumer's reference point is x, he agrees to enter a store whenever y belongs to the set of products it o¤ers.) In the second stage, the consumer chooses one of the most preferred products in the consideration set (with a tie-breaking rule that favors the reference point s).
For most of the paper, we assume that R is complete and transitive. This restriction captures the above-mentioned idea that consumers demand a reason that would justify considering products in M as potential substitutes to s. A preference criterion is a natural example of such a reason. The criterion underlying the consideration relation need not coincide with actual preferences. The former re ‡ects a super…cial impression, while the latter is the outcome of careful deliberation or consumption experience. One may wonder why the consumer applies R as a screening criterion if it fails to coincide with his actual preferences. First, the screening criterion can be instinctive and "hardwired"rather than a result of deliberation (think of a rule such as "bigger is better"). Second, the criterion may be a reasonable predictor of preferences across a large set of markets. Using the criterion as a screening device saves cognitive costs because it can be applied to many market situations. However, it may diverge from the consumer's preferences in any particular instance.
The heart of the paper is a pair of market applications, in which two identical …rms compete over a homogeneous population of consumers who follow the consideration-sets procedure. These applications have the property that if consumers were rational, the equilibrium outcome would be manifestly competitive and no marketing device would ever be employed. We …rst analyze a model in which …rms simultaneously choose menus of products and aim to maximize market share minus the …xed cost of adding products to the menu. For half the population of consumers, M coincides with …rm 1's menu and s is the most preferred product on …rm 2's menu, and vice versa for the other half. We assume that the consumers' most preferred product also has the highest menu cost, and that the cost of o¤ering the grand set is lower than the value of a 50% market share. If consumers were rational, …rms would o¤er the consumers' most preferred product as a singleton in Nash equilibrium.
In contrast, as long as the most preferred product is not a R-maximal product as well, the outcome of symmetric Nash equilibrium is non-competitive, in the sense that …rms o¤er inferior products with positive probability. Moreover, …rms necessarily o¤er non-singleton menus with positive probability in symmetric equilibrium. A nonsingleton menu necessarily contains "irrelevant alternatives"-namely, products which consumers never choose. The function of these products is to attract consumers'serious attention to other, better products on the same menu. Thus, the costly use of irrelevant alternatives as a marketing device is a necessary counterpart of a non-competitive equilibrium outcome. The expected cost of irrelevant alternatives may be viewed as a "deadweight loss"resulting from consumer bounded rationality.
Our main result is that although the equilibrium outcome may be non-competitive, …rms necessarily earn "competitive payo¤s" in symmetric Nash equilibrium-that is, industry pro…ts are as if consumers were rational. From this perspective, the function of irrelevant alternatives is to restore an aspect of market competitiveness which is initially eroded by consumer bounded rationality. The competitive-payo¤ result has a subtle corollary concerning the e¤ectiveness of irrelevant alternatives as a marketing device. Recall that the function of irrelevant alternatives is to "get the customer into the store". It turns out that in symmetric equilibrium, whenever the consumer considers a …rm because of an irrelevant alternative in its menu, he necessarily ends up buying from that …rm (unless his outside option is the best possible product). We refer to this result as the "e¤ective marketing property".
To further demonstrate the scope of our framework, we also study a model of competitive advertising. The consideration-sets procedure allows two products to be equivalent in terms of the preference relation yet distinct in terms of the consideration relation. One possible interpretation is that the two products are in fact the same product as far as the consumption experience is concerned, but they are framed di¤erently and therefore di¤er in the set of products from which they attract serious attention.
In the competitive-advertising model, each …rm sells a single product which is characterized both by its set of actual features P and by the subset of features A P which the …rm chooses to advertise. We assume that in terms of preferences, consumers care only about the number of actual product features. The consideration relation R, in contrast, is de…ned over pairs (P; A). Di¤erent speci…cations of R capture di¤erent assumptions regarding the way advertising manipulates consumers'consideration sets. Our main result in this section is that whenever R is complete and transitive, …rms earn competitive payo¤s in symmetric Nash equilibrium. We also characterize symmetric equilibria under an example of such a consideration relation. The characterization consists of a description of the products that …rms o¤er as well as the way they choose to advertise them.
Our paper contributes to a growing theoretical literature on market interaction between pro…t-maximizing …rms and boundedly rational consumers. Piccione and Rubinstein (2003) The plan of the paper is as follows. We present the consideration-sets procedure in Section 2, where we also discuss some related choice-theoretic literature. We analyze the competition-in-menus model in Section 3. Section 4 is devoted to the competitive advertising model. We conclude in Section 5 with a discussion of variations and extensions. Proofs not given in the main text are relegated to the Appendix.
Consideration Sets
Let X be a …nite set of products. A menu is a non-empty subset of X. A choice problem is a pair (M; s), where M is a menu and s 2 X is a "reference point", which may or may not belong to M . The interpretation we will favor in this paper is that M is a set of products o¤ered by a new store the consumer is yet to be familiar with, while s is a product the consumer regularly buys or used to buy from another supplier. A choice correspondence assigns to each choice problem a non-empty subset of M [ fsg.
The consumer chooses according to a procedure based on two primitives: a standard preference relation % over X and another binary relation R over X, which we call the "consideration relation". For any menu M , let b(M ) denote the set of %-maximal products in M . The relation yRx means that the consumer is willing to consider y at x. As explained in the Introduction, in the sequel we will often assume that R is complete and transitive. The procedure consists of two stages. In the …rst stage, the consumer constructs a consideration set according to the following rule. If xRs for some x 2 M , the consideration set coincides with the feasible set M [ fsg; otherwise, the consideration set is fsg. In the second stage, the consumer chooses a %-maximal product in the consideration set he constructed in the …rst stage. The reference point is chosen whenever it is a %-maximal element in the consideration set. The procedure thus induces the following choice correspondence: c(M; s) = b(M [ fsg) if xRs for some x 2 M and b(M ) s, and c(M; s) = s otherwise.
The consideration relation R enriches our description of the consumer's psychology. In addition to his preferences, the consumer is characterized by his willingness to consider new products, and consequently by the lengths to which a marketer has to go in order to draw his serious attention to new products. Personality psychologists often regard "openness to experience" as one of the basic traits that de…ne an individual's personality (see Goldberg (1993) ). The consideration relation may be viewed as a representation of this trait: a more "open"personality corresponds to a consideration relation that induces a larger set f(x; y) 2 X X j yRxg.
The choice correspondence induced by the consideration-sets procedure violates the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. For instance, let X = fx; y; zg, x y z, zRy, x / Ry. Then, c(fx; zg; y) = fxg whereas c(fxg; y) = y. Thus, despite the fact that the primitives of the choice procedure are two preference relations, the induced choice behavior may violate rationality. The following example illustrates another non-standard e¤ect of our model: adding s to the menu M may cause the consumer to switch from the reference point to another product in M . For instance, let X = fx; yg, x y, yRy, x / Ry. Then, c(fxg; y) = fyg whereas c(fx; yg; y) = fxg. Note that the consideration-sets procedure contains rational choice as a special case, when yRx for every two products x; y.
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Related choice-theoretic literature
Complete choice-theoretic analysis of the consideration-sets procedure is outside the scope of the present study, which is more concerned with the procedure's implications for market behavior. Nevertheless, it is insightful to draw some comparisons with other decision models in the choice-theoretic literature.
The Rational Shortlist Method due to Mariotti and Manzini (2007) is a procedure which, like our model, applies two binary relations sequentially. The …rst binary relation is used to shrink the menu into a "shortlist" (Mariotti and Manzini rely on the standard de…nition of a choice problem as a menu), while the second binary relation selects a unique product from the shortlist. To see the di¤erence between the two procedures, note that under the Rational Shortlist Method, if both binary relations are complete and transitive, the procedure is reduced to standard lexicographic preferences. In contrast, our model accommodates non-rational choice even when both binary relations are preference relations.
Our notion of a choice problem with a reference point follows a number of recent choice models, e.g., Rubinstein and Zhou (1999) and Masatlioglu and Ok (2005) . The latter paper interprets the reference point as a status quo and provides an axiomatization of a decision rule based on an incomplete preference relation over X. The decision maker chooses an element x 6 = s from M if and only if there exists such an element which is superior to s according to the incomplete preference relation. The important behavioral di¤erence between the Masatlioglu-Ok model and the consideration-sets procedure is that the former model satis…es Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. More broadly, the two models can be viewed as capturing di¤erent types of a status quo bias. The Masatlioglu-Ok model addresses this bias as a feature of the decision maker's preferences, whereas in our model, the conservative bias in favor of the reference point occurs at an earlier stage of the decision process, in which the decision maker constructs the set to which he will ultimately apply his preferences.
The most closely related choice-theoretic paper to ours is Masatlioglu and Nakajima (2007), who characterize a class of choice correspondences that accommodates endogenously determined reference points. In particular, a decision maker who falls into this class behaves as if he applies a preference ranking to an endogenously determined "comparison set". This class of decision rules is quite general. First, it allows the comparison set to depend on the alternative under consideration. As a result, eventual choices are "…xed points": the decision maker chooses an alternative which is optimal given the comparison set assigned to this very alternative. Second, Masatlioglu and Nakajima are agnostic about the determinants of the comparison set, and therefore do not specify how an outside agent could manipulate it. At the same time, the generality of their framework allows them to subsume a large variety of reference-dependent decision models, including our consideration-sets procedure, as special cases. Indeed, from the point of view of the present paper, the contribution of Masatlioglu and Nakajima (2007) is to characterize the weakest possible decision model with consideration sets. In this sense (as well as in their focus on choice-theoretic analysis rather than market applications), their study complements ours.
Competitive Marketing
In this section we present a market model that incorporates the choice procedure presented in Section 2. Two identical …rms compete for a continuum of measure one of identical consumers. Each …rm i simultaneously chooses a menu M i , which can be any non-empty subset of a …nite set of products X = f1; 2; :::; ng, n > 1. Let c x be a strictly positive …xed cost associated with adding the product x to the menu, where c 1 > c x for all x 6 = 1. The cost of a menu M is thus c(M ) = P x2M c x . Each …rm maximizes the fraction of consumers who choose a product from its menu, minus the costs associated with that menu. (We abstract from price setting -see a discussion in Section 5.2.) We assume that c(X) < 1 2 . That is, if a …rm o¤ers the grand set and gets a market share of 50%, it earns a strictly positive pro…t.
Consumers choose a product according to the consideration-sets procedure. Consumer preferences are strict: 1 2 n. Slightly abusing the notation introduced in Section 2, b(M ) denotes the -maximal product in M . Given a strategy pro…le (M 1 ; M 2 ), the choice problem is (M 1 ; b(M 2 )) for one half of the population of consumers and (M 2 ; b(M 1 )) for the other half. The interpretation is that for some consumers, …rm 1 is the incumbent. Therefore, as the market interaction begins, their outside option is e¤ectively the best product in …rm 1's menu. The market interaction between the …rms then determines whether these consumers will consider the unfamiliar …rm 2. For the other consumers, …rm 2 is the incumbent and …rm 1 is the challenger. We impose a "minimal richness" condition on the consideration relation R: for every x 2 X, there exists y 2 X (possibly x itself) such that yRx.
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The consumers'choice rule induces a strategic game between the …rms. The minimal richness condition implies that the max-min strategy is the pure strategy f1g and the max-min payo¤ is 1 2 c 1 . When the consumer is rational, these are also the Nash equilibrium strategy and Nash equilibrium payo¤s, respectively. We refer to the Nash equilibrium outcome in the rational-consumer case as the "competitive outcome" and to 1 2 c 1 as the "competitive payo¤ ". We will make use of the following terminology and notation. A menu M beats
for a …rm is a probability distribution over menus. The support of is denoted S( ). Given a mixed strategy , let (x) and (x) denote the probabilities that x is o¤ered as a -maximal and as a -inferior, "irrelevant" product. That is,
Equilibrium Analysis
We begin with a pair of examples that are based on two extreme cases of our model. First, suppose that for all x; y 2 X, yRx if and only if y x or y = x. That is, the criteria underlying the consideration and preference relations perfectly coincide (except that is a linear ordering whereas R is re ‡exive). In this case, it is easy to check that the Nash equilibrium outcome is competitive.
For purely illustrative purposes, let us now examine the opposite case in which the criteria underlying the consideration and preference relations are diametrically opposed (except that as in the previous example, is a linear ordering whereas R is re ‡exive).
Remark 1
Assume that for all x; y 2 X, yRx if and only if x y or x = y. Assume further that c n < c x for all x 6 = n. Then, there is a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy. The equilibrium strategy is mixed and given as follows:
This equilibrium has several noteworthy properties. First, the equilibrium strategy is mixed and consumers end up choosing an inferior product with positive probability. Second, …rms o¤er an "irrelevant alternative"with positive probability in equilibrium. This alternative is never chosen by the consumer, but it serves to attract his serious attention to a better product on the menu. Third, while the equilibrium outcome is not competitive, the …rms'equilibrium payo¤ is at the competitive level. To see why, observe that the menu f1g belongs to the support of the equilibrium strategy. Yet, the consumer is not willing to consider 1 at n, and therefore the market share that the menu f1g generates is exactly 1 2 . Our task in this sub-section is to investigate the generality of these observations.
Non-competitive equilibrium outcomes
As we observed earlier, …rms choose f1g and earn a payo¤ of 1 2 c 1 in Nash equilibrium when the consumer is rational, as well as when and R coincide. The following result states a necessary and su¢ cient condition for a competitive equilibrium outcome.
Proposition 1 Firms play f1g with probability one in Nash equilibrium if and only if 1Rx for every x 6 = 1.
Proof. Assume 1Rx for every x 6 = 1. Clearly, if both …rms play f1g, no …rm has an incentive to deviate to another menu because f1g beats any menu M with b(M ) 6 = 1, while any other menu M with b(M ) = 1 attains the same market share and costs more. Now suppose that there exists a non-competitive (potentially asymmetric) Nash equilibrium ( 1 ; 2 ). If both …rms assign positive probability only to menus M with b(M ) = 1, then f1g is the unique best-reply for each …rm, a contradiction. Therefore, at least one …rm assigns positive probability to menus M with b(
. Note that b(M ) 6 = 1 and that M does not beat any menu in S( 2 ). Suppose that …rm 1 deviates from M to X. Then, the …rm increases its market share by at least 1 2
, because the deviation prevents being beaten by menus M 0 2 S( ) with b(M 0 ) = 1, and it allows beating any menu
The cost of this deviation is below 1 2 , hence the deviation is pro…table. Now assume 1 / Rx for some x 6 = 1. If both …rms play f1g, then it is pro…table for any …rm to deviate from f1g to fxg, increasing its payo¤ from Thus, a non-competitive equilibrium outcome emerges when the preference and consideration relations induce a di¤erent ranking between the most preferred product and some other product in X.
Equilibrium use of irrelevant alternatives
As we saw in Section 2, the consumer's choice procedure violates Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. The question arises, whether …rms respond to this feature in equilibrium by o¤ering irrelevant alternatives -i.e., products which a¤ect the consumer's choice without themselves being chosen. Our next result answers in the a¢ rmative. This result is preceded by a lemma stating that in any symmetric equilibrium, …rms o¤er the most preferred product with positive probability.
Lemma 1 Let be a symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy. Then, (1) > 0.
Proof. Assume the contrary. Given symmetry of equilibrium, a …rm's equilibrium payo¤ is below 1 2 . If the …rm deviates to the pure strategy X, it ensures that all consumers choose it, yielding a payo¤ of 1 c(X) > 
Proposition 2 If 1 /
Rx for some x 6 = 1, then in any symmetric Nash equilibrium , S( ) contains a non-singleton menu.
Proof. Assume the contrary that S( ) consists of singletons only. By Lemma 1, f1g 2 S( ). At the same time, by Proposition 1, there exists x 6 = 1 such that (fxg) > 0. Suppose that a …rm deviate from f1g to X. The cost of this deviation is c(X) c 1 . The bene…t from this deviation is 1 2
The …rms'decision not to carry out this deviation implies that 1 2
Suppose that (fxg) > 0 for some x 6 = 1, 1Rx. Let x denote the -minimal such product. Suppose that a …rm deviates from fx g to f1; x g. The cost of this deviation is c 1 . The bene…t from this deviation is at least 1 2 f1g + 1 2 P x6 =1;1Rx (fxg), because the deviation prevents being beaten by f1g and allows beating any fxg with x 6 = 1, 1Rx. From the …rms'decision not to carry out this deviation, we conclude that
Combining the two inequalities, we obtain 1 2 c(X), a contradiction. It follows that (fxg) = 0 for every x 6 = 1, 1Rx. Therefore, f1g generates a payo¤ of 1 2 c 1 . Now consider the -maximal product y 6 = 1 for which (fyg) > 0. By our previous step, 1 / Ry. Therefore, fyg generates a payo¤ of at least Since an irrelevant alternative is costly to o¤er and never chosen by the consumer, the equilibrium use of irrelevant alternatives is socially wasteful. However, it is an integral part of the …rms'competitive strategy whenever the condition for a competitive equilibrium outcome is not met.
It is interesting to compare the role of irrelevant alternatives in our model to the role of "loss leaders" in papers such as Lal and Matutes (1994) . In both cases, the direct revenues from the product do not cover its costs, yet …rms o¤er this product because it enables them to earn a pro…t from another product. However, loss leaders in these models are not "irrelevant alternatives", as consumers purchase them with certainty.
Competitive equilibrium payo¤s
Our results so far relied only on the minimal richness condition. The next result is the …rst to utilize the assumption that R is complete and transitive. Recall that Proposition 3 Firms earn a payo¤ of 1 2 c 1 in any symmetric Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Assume the contrary. By Lemma 1, the set of menus M= fM 2 S( ) j b(M ) = 1g is non-empty. Every menu in M beats some other menu in S( ) -otherwise, the …rms' equilibrium payo¤ could not exceed the competitive level. De…ne the menu M 2 S( ) as follows. For every other menu M in S( ), b(M )Rb(M ), and either
By the completeness and transitivity of R, M is well-de…ned. Moreover, M does not beat any other menu in S( ), and it is beaten by every menu in M. Therefore, if a …rm deviates from M to the menu X, it increases its market share by at least
, which by assumption is strictly higher than the added menu cost c(X) c(M ). Thus, the deviation is pro…table, a contradiction.
Thus, …rms earn competitive payo¤s in symmetric Nash equilibrium. This result is important for several reasons. First, it carries an immediate welfare implication. On one hand, Proposition 1 implies that when 1 / Rx for some x 6 = 1, consumers select inferior products with positive probability, hence they are strictly worse o¤ than in the full-rationality benchmark. On the other hand, Proposition 3 implies that …rms earn competitive payo¤s. It follows that whenever the conditions for a competitive equilibrium outcome are not met, the symmetric equilibrium outcome is necessarily Pareto inferior to the rational-consumer equilibrium outcome.
The competitive-payo¤ result also has implications for market entry. Although our model abstracts from entry concerns, one could construct more elaborate, multipleindustry models in which consumers in any individual market behave according to the consideration-sets procedure, where the consideration relation R could be marketspeci…c. One might suspect a priori that consumers' departure from rational choice could lead to a distortion in the …rms'market entry decisions. However, Proposition 3 implies that the …rms' decision whether to enter a market is the same as when consumers are rational.
E¤ective marketing Proposition 3 implies another, subtler corollary, which concerns the equilibrium effectiveness of irrelevant alternatives as marketing devices. Firms in our model use irrelevant alternatives as marketing devices whose objective is to "get the customer into the store". Clearly, the fact that a marketing device attracts the consumer's serious attention to a store does not automatically guarantee that he will buy at that store. When this event occurs nonetheless, we say that marketing is "e¤ective".
De…nition 1 (E¤ective Marketing
The e¤ective marketing property means that whenever a consumer considers a …rm only because of an irrelevant alternative it o¤ers, he ends up buying from that …rm (unless his reference point is the best possible product)
Proposition 4
Any symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy satis…es the e¤ective marketing property.
Proof. Assume the contrary -i.e., there exist menus M; M 0 2 S( ) such that (y) c x . Now suppose that a …rm deviates to the menu f1; xg. By Proposition 3, …rms earn competitive payo¤s in equilibrium. Therefore, (x) = 0 for all x 6 = 1, 1Rx -otherwise, the menu f1g would yield a payo¤ above 1 2 c 1 . Therefore, the marginal contribution of x to the market share generated by the menu f1; xg is at least
(y), which strictly exceeds c x . Therefore, the menu f1; xg yields a payo¤ strictly above The next result presents a di¤erent sense in which equilibrium marketing is "effective". If two products belong to the same menu in the support of a symmetric equilibrium strategy, the sets of products from which they attract serious attention in equilibrium are necessarily disjoint. In other words, …rms exercise specialization in their equilibrium use of marketing devices.
Proposition 5 Let be a symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy. Then, for any nonsingleton menu M 2 S( ) and any pair of products x; x 0 2 M , the sets fy 2 X j (y) > 0 and yRxg and fy 2 X j (y) > 0 and yRx 0 g are disjoint.
Proof. Assume the contrary -i.e., that there exists a menu M 2 S( ) containing two products x; x 0 , x 0 x, such that the sets fy 2 X j (y) > 0 and yRxg and fy 2 X j (y) > 0 and yRx 0 g have non-empty intersection. Therefore, the marginal contribution of x to the market share generated by M is strictly below P xRy, b(M ) y (y). >From the …rms decision to include x in M as part of a bestreply to , we conclude that P
Using the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 4, a deviation to f1; xg is strictly pro…table.
It should be emphasized that Propositions 4 and 5 rely on the assumption that R is complete and transitive only indirectly. They are direct corollaries of Proposition 3, and would therefore hold under any consideration relation that induces competitive payo¤s in symmetric equilibrium.
Summary
The results in this sub-section shed light on the nature of competitive behavior when consumers follow the consideration-sets procedure. As long as consumers are not willing to consider the most preferred product at all other products, the equilibrium outcome fails to be competitive. However, it does retain an aspect of competitiveness, in the sense that …rms earn the same equilibrium payo¤ as in the rational-consumer benchmark. Irrelevant alternatives are employed with positive probability. It is the use of irrelevant alternatives as a marketing device that generates the competitive force that brings industry pro…ts to the competitive level. Another aspect of competitive equilibrium behavior is that the deployment of marketing devices is "cost-e¤ective". First, when an irrelevant alternative is responsible for "getting the consumer into the store", he ends up buying there. Second, di¤erent products on a …rm's menu attract consumers away from di¤erent outside options.
Other Classes of Consideration Relations
So far we restricted attention to complete and transitive consideration relations, re ‡ect-ing the idea that consumers'resistance to considering new alternatives …nds expression in a demand for a reason that would justify looking into M . However, the formation of consideration sets may be based on alternative criteria. Chakravarti and Janiszewski (2003) present experimental evidence suggesting that when people are asked to choose from a large set of diverse alternatives, they tend to focus on a small subset of "easy-tocompare" options having alignable or overlapping attributes. A pair of alternatives is more likely to enter the consideration set as their alignability or number of overlapping features increase. One implication of this …nding is that consumers may be reluctant to consider products that are hard to compare with their outside option.
In this sub-section we relax the assumption that R is complete and transitive. We retain the minimal richness condition -for every x 2 X, there exists y 2 X (possibly x itself) such that yRx. As already mentioned, some of the results in the previous subsection do not rely on the completeness or transitivity of R. Speci…cally, Propositions 1 and 2, as well as Lemma 1, only rely on minimal richness. Furthermore, our results on "e¤ective marketing" (Propositions 4 and 5) are corollaries of the competitive-payo¤ result. If, for whatever reason, …rms earn competitive payo¤s in symmetric Nash equilibrium under some R, these two propositions continue to hold.
The remainder of this section thus deals with the following question: Does the competitive-payo¤ result survive the extension to other families of consideration relations?
Similarity-based consideration relations
The …ndings of Chakravarti and Janiszewski (2003) suggest that the formation of consideration sets may be based on similarity judgments. Since there is no single obvious de…nition of similarity, and di¤erent intuitions about similarity give rise to di¤erent de…nitions (see Tversky (1977) and Rubinstein (1988) ), we propose two examples.
Equivalence relations.
A consideration relation R is an equivalence relation if it is re ‡exive, symmetric and transitive. This case …ts situations in which products are divided into mutually exclusive categories, such that two products are deemed similar if they belong to the same category.
2. Linear similarity. Let : X ! R be a one-to-one function that assigns to each product a distinct location along the real line. Assume that for every x 2 X, yRx if (y) belongs to some arbitrary neighborhood of (x). We refer to such R as a linear similarity relation. It …ts situations in which products are represented by points on a e¢ ciency frontier in R 2 ++ (e.g., soft drinks are characterized by tastiness and healthiness, such that the tastier the beverage, the less healthy it is), and two products are similar if they lie close to each other along the frontier. In general, a linear similarity relation need not be symmetric, transitive or complete. However, it is obviously re ‡exive, since any neighborhood of (x) necessarily contains itself.
Proposition 6
Suppose that R is an equivalence relation or a linear similarity relation. Then, …rms earn a payo¤ of 1 2 c 1 in any symmetric Nash equilibrium.
The identity relation (yRx if and only if x = y) is a special case of both equivalence and linear similarity relations. It turns out that symmetric Nash equilibria in this case have a particularly clean characterization.
Proposition 7
If R is the identity relation, then in any symmetric Nash equilibrium , (x) = 2c x and (x) = 2c 1 2c x for all x 6 = 1.
Thus, all products x 6 = 1 are o¤ered with the same probability 2c 1 in symmetric equilibrium. The more costly the product, the higher (lower) the probability it is o¤ered as a -maximal product (an irrelevant alternative).
Given the equilibrium characterization of ( ) and ( ), we can calculate the fraction of consumers who switch a supplier in symmetric equilibrium, denoted ( ). In order for a consumer to switch from one …rm to the other, the best product in the former's menu must be o¤ered by the other …rm as an irrelevant alternative. This leads to the following expression:
Our assumptions on menu costs ensure that ( ) 2 (0; 1). Thus, consumers switch suppliers in equilibrium. By comparison, no switching occurs in the rational-consumer benchmark. Note that ( ) behaves non-monotonically in menu costs, and approaches an upper bound of (n 1) c 2 1 as the costs of all products x 6 = 1 cluster near c 1 =2. The reason for this non-monotonicity is that as a product becomes more costly, it is o¤ered less frequently as an irrelevant alternative and more frequently as a -maximal product.
The switching fraction is exactly equal to the expected cost of irrelevant alternatives, because for each x 6 = 1, the probability it is o¤ered as an irrelevant alternative by each …rm is by de…nition (x), while by Proposition 7, (x) is equal to twice the cost of x. Thus, the general relation between the social cost of irrelevant alternatives and their role in attracting consumers'attention is especially transparent when R is the identity relation, because the "deadweight loss"associated with irrelevant alternatives is equal to consumers'switching frequency.
The identity relation is an example of a re ‡exive binary relation -i.e., xRx for all x 2 X. We say that a consideration relation R 0 is richer than R if yRx implies yR 0 x for all x; y 2 X. Any re ‡exive relation is richer than the identity relation, and the consideration relation that …ts a rational consumer is the richest of them all. In the two extreme cases of the identity relation and the rational-consumer relation, …rms earn competitive payo¤s in symmetric Nash equilibrium. Intuitively, as the consideration relation becomes richer, the market friction due to consumers'bounded rationality gets weaker, because the consideration set coincides with the feasible set for a larger family of strategy pro…les. Therefore, one might expect that the competitive payo¤ result would hold for all re ‡exive consideration relations. This intuition turns out to be false, as the following counter-example demonstrates. Let X be the set of all three-digit binary numbers, excluding 000. Assume that 111 x for every x 6 = 111. Also, assume that yRx if x and y have at least two identical digits. This R is richer than the identity relation. Assume that c 111 = 1 3 , whereas c x = c < for all x 6 = 111. It can be shown that there exists a continuum of symmetric equilibria with the following properties: (i) the support of the equilibrium strategy consists of f111; 110g, f111; 101g, f111; 001g, f100g, f010g and f001g; (ii) the equilibrium payo¤ is strictly above the competitive level of 
Small menu costs
The previous counter-example means that in general, …rms may earn above-competitive equilibrium payo¤s under an arbitrary consideration relation. We conjecture that for generic cost structures, …rms indeed earn competitive payo¤s in symmetric Nash equilibrium under any minimally rich consideration relation. So far, we have been able to obtain a general competitive-payo¤ result for su¢ ciently low menu costs.
Proposition 8 Suppose that R satis…es the minimal richness condition. Then, …rms earn a payo¤ of 1 2 c 1 in symmetric Nash equilibrium whenever c 1 < 1=(2 n + 2n).
This result is somewhat unsatisfactory, in the sense that when menu costs are su¢ ciently small, the outcome itself is close to the competitive benchmark, as our next result demonstrates.
Proposition 9
As c tends to zero, (1) converges to one under any symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy .
Thus, a competitive-payo¤ result that holds only when the outcome is close to competitive anyway takes the sting out of the distinction between competitiveness of the market outcome and competitiveness of industry pro…ts. The (open) problem is what kind of a general competitive-payo¤ result could emerge under our original, signi…cantly weaker assumptions on menu costs.
Competitive Advertising
The model in Section 3 assumes strict consumer preferences. In particular, this rules out con…gurations such as x y, xRz and y / Rz. One interpretation of such a con…g-uration is that x are y are the same product as far as the consumption experience is concerned, yet they di¤er in the way they are framed. Thus, allowing weak preferences enables us to capture situations in which …rms decide not only which product to sell but also how to frame it for consumers. We now use this basic insight to construct a model of competitive advertising. 4 In a classical model of price competition with advertising, Butters (1977) assumes that …rms attract consumers' attention by posting ads. Butters' "advertising technology" can be embedded in our framework: every product x comes in two variants, advertised and unadvertised, denoted x a and x u , such that: (i) x a x u , and (ii) for any x; y 2 X and any i 2 fa; ug, x a Ry i and x u / Ry i . However, our model goes beyond Butters in providing a language for formulating a richer family of "advertising technologies". Let F = f1; :::; Kg be a …nite set of product features. Let X be the set of all pairs (P; A), where A P F and P 6 = ?. Firms simultaneously choose pairs (P; A) from X. A …rm's cost of o¤ering (P; A) is c (P;A) = c p jP j + c a jAj, where c p ; c a > 0. Assume
. Given a strategy pro…le (x 1 ; x 2 ), the consumer's choice problem is equally likely to be (fx 1 g; fx 2 g) or (fx 2 g; fx 1 g). Assume that (P; A) (P; A 0 ) if jP j > jP 0 j. When consumers are rational, …rms play (F; ?) in Nash equilibrium and earn a payo¤ of 1 2 Kc p , which is henceforth referred to as the "competitive payo¤". As before, we restrict attention to complete and transitive consideration relations. In addition, we assume that (F; F )R(P; A) for every (P; A). That is, if a …rm produces the highest-quality product and advertises all its features, it secures the consumer's attention. The following are examples of consideration relations that satisfy these conditions: (i) (P 0 ; A 0 )R(P; A) if jA 0 j jP j; (ii) (P 0 ; A 0 )R(P; A) if jA 0 j jAj. In example (i), the decision whether to consider the new product depends on some relation between its advertised features and the actual features of the outside option. (This relation happens to be mirror the criterion underlying actual preferences, but this need not be the case -see below.) In example (ii), the decision depends on an analogous relation between the advertised features of both products. The interpretation of the former case is that the consumer has experienced the product (P; A) and therefore he is familiar with its actual features. In order to persuade him to consider the new product, the ads associated with it must declare that it is better than the original product, according to some preference criterion. The interpretation of the latter case is that although the consumer initially consumes one product, he is not intimately familiar with its features at the time he starts considering alternatives. This …ts telecommunication or banking services, where the consumer does not actually experience features such as the price per minute or banking fees, hence his initial impression is purely based on advertising.
The main result in this section establishes that …rms earn competitive payo¤s in symmetric Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 10 Firms earn a payo¤ of 1 2 Kc p in any symmetric Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The proof follows the same logic as the proof of Proposition 3, which is the analogous result for the model of Section 3. Let be a symmetric Nash equilibrium (mixed) strategy, and let S( ) denote its support. Our …rst step is to show that there exists a subset A F such that (F; A) 2 S( ). Assume the contrary. Then, it is pro…table for a …rm to deviate from one of the %-minimal elements (P; A) in S( ) to (F; F ) -the deviation will increase the …rm's market share by 1 2 , whereas the added cost is by assumption below 1 2 . It is easy to see that if (F; ?) 2 S( ), …rms earn 1 2 Kc p under . It follows that in order for …rms to earn a payo¤ above the competitive level, for each element of the form (F; A) in S( ) there must exist some (P 0 ; A 0 ) 2 S( ) such that P 0 F and (F; A)R(P 0 ; A 0 ). By completeness and transitivity of R, we can identify a class of R-minimal elements in S( ). Among these elements, select some %-minimal element (P; A). By our previous argument, P 6 = F . By construction, (P; A) fails to beat any element in S( ), and it is beaten by all elements of the form (F; A) in S( ). Therefore, if a …rm deviates from (P; A) to (F; F ), it raises its market share by 1 2 while increasing its cost by less than 1 2 , a contradiction.
For a simple illustration of this result, consider the following example: (P 0 ; A 0 )R(P; A)
if and only if max(A 0 ) max(P ). The interpretation is that when the consumer decides whether to consider a new product, he relies on an intuitive ranking of features.
According to this ranking, feature k is more important than feature j if k > j. The consumer's preference ranking, in contrast, treats all features symmetrically. The following mixed strategy is a symmetric equilibrium strategy:
In fact, it can be shown that this is essentially the unique symmetric equilibrium under this speci…cation of R. Any other symmetric equilibrium is the same as given above, except that (fKg; ?) is replaced with any collection of (fkg; ?), such that P k (fkg; ?) = 2c a . Thus, …rms produce the most or least preferred products, and avoid o¤ering intermediate-quality products. When a …rm o¤ers the most preferred product, it either advertises the most important feature according to the consideration relation, or it avoids advertising altogether.
Note that this equilibrium satis…es an e¤ective marketing property: whenever the consumer's reference point is not the most preferred product, considering a new product only because of its advertising culminates in buying that product. However, the e¤ective marketing property does not necessarily hold in the competitive advertising model. The reason is that in the competition-in-menus model, irrelevant alternatives a¤ect the fraction of consumers who switch away from the rival …rm, but they cannot a¤ect the fraction of consumers who switch to the rival …rm. In contrast, in the current model, …rms'advertising decision can a¤ect consumer switching in both directions.
Variations and Extensions
Alternative Models of Consideration-Set Formation
The choice procedure presented in Section 2 is arguably the simplest way to introduce the idea of consideration sets into a model of consumer choice. In this sub-section we discuss a pair of somewhat more complicated variants. First, suppose that we replace the reference point s with a reference set of products S. In this variant, the consideration set is S [ M whenever yRx for some x 2 S and y 2 M , and S otherwise. The interpretation is that at the time the consumer determines whether to consider the new menu M , he has not yet reached a tentative choice from the set of products he is already familiar with. Since every product in the reference set is a potential choice, it makes sense to apply the consideration relation to all of them. This variant is particularly suited to the competition-in-menus model of Section 3, where it is natural to identify S with the menu o¤ered by the consumer's "incumbent"…rm. It turns out that under the restriction to complete and transitive R, all the results in Section 3 continue to hold. Proofs are available upon request.
Another variant addresses our assumption that once the consumer …nds a product
x 2 M such that xRs, he considers the entire menu M . This variant assumes that the consumer constructs the consideration set iteratively: CS 0 = fsg and for any k > 0,
In this case, the consideration set ends up being the largest subset of M [ fsg having the property that for every x 2 M there is y 2 M [ fsg such that xRy. The interpretation is that even when "inside the store", the consumer continues to display his original reluctance to consider new alternatives. When R is complete and transitive, this variant curbs the incentive to use irrelevant alternatives. In fact, it can be shown that when R is transitive, …rms would not o¤er products that the consumer never chooses in the model of Section 3.
Price Setting
Throughout this paper, we abstracted from price setting and assumed that …rms try to maximize market share minus …xed costs. Our motivation was analytic simplicity. As in older marketing models -a prime example of which is the Hotelling strategic location model -it is easier to start by assuming that …rms care only about market share and defer the incorporation of price setting. The reason price setting complicates the model is that when a …rm decides whether to add an irrelevant alternative to its menu, it needs to know its payo¤ when consumers choose the -maximal product on the menu. In the model of Section 3, this payo¤ is …xed, whereas in a model with price setting, it depends on the price associated with the -maximal element. Incorporating price setting is of particular interest because many natural speci…-cation of the consideration relation involve price comparisons. For instance, consider the following extended model. Let X = Z [0; 1), where Z is a …nite set of product types and [0; 1) is the set of feasible prices. Consumer preferences satisfy the following condition: (z; p) (z; p 0 ) whenever p < p 0 . A natural example of a complete and transitive consideration relation in this context is (z; p)R(z; p 0 ) if and only if p p 0 .
Another plausible de…nition is (z 0 ; p 0 )R(z; p) if and only if z = z 0 and p 0 < p (under this alternative de…nition, R is transitive but incomplete). One would like to know whether the main results of Section 3 persist under these assumptions. In addition, the extended model allows for both "product dispersion"(di¤erent products being offered with positive probability) and "price dispersion"(the same product being o¤ered at two di¤erent prices). Characterizing the equilibrium patterns of product and price dispersion is an interesting challenge for future research.
Consumer Heterogeneity
Since consumers in our model are characterized by two primitives, % and R, heterogeneity may exist in both dimensions. Consider heterogeneity in R …rst. It can be shown that in the model of Section 3, if consumers di¤er only in their consideration relations and the distribution of consumer types is held …xed, …rms earn the competitive payo¤ 1 2 c 1 in any symmetric Nash equilibrium for su¢ ciently low menu costs. In contrast, it is not true that for a …xed cost structure, if the competitive-payo¤ result holds for all consideration relations in the collection R = fR 1 ; ::; R K g, then it must also hold for a heterogeneous consumer population with some distribution over R. To see why, let X = f1; 2g and suppose that R 1 is the identity relation whereas yR 2 x for all x; y 2 X. It is easy to show that for a certain range of distributions over fR 1 ; R 2 g, the symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy has a support ff1g; f2g; f1; 2gg. This means that …rms earn an expected payo¤ above the competitive level, because the menu f1g attracts R 2 -consumers away from the menu f2g.
Now consider the case of heterogeneity in %. The reason we avoided heterogeneous consumer preferences is that we wanted to have a clear rational-consumer benchmark, and the equilibrium outcome under consumer rationality is sensitive to the exact distribution over consumer preferences. Some of our results are extreme as a result of this modeling strategy. First, when the set of preferences in the population is su¢ ciently rich, every product will be found to be optimal by some consumers, and therefore no menu can contain totally "irrelevant" alternatives. Second, the e¤ective marketing property is unlikely to hold under heterogeneous preferences. One of the challenges of extending our models in this direction is to formulate analogues of these two e¤ects when consumer preferences are diverse.
Endogenizing the Consideration Relation: Internet Search
Our model is non-standard in the sense that it introduces a new primitive into a model of consumer choice. The reader may wonder to what extent our model can be "rationalized". In particular, can the consideration relation be endogenized as a best-reply to market environments such as those studied in Sections 3 and 4? If one views R as a description of a personality trait such as "openness to experience", then endogenizing R has the same urgency as endogenizing %. In this section, however, we propose an alternative interpretation of R, in which case it may seem desirable to derive R from more conventional primitives.
The alternative interpretation is based on the notion of consumer search. Models of search are typically based on some concrete image of the underlying search technology. Sequential-search models evoke a picture of a consumer literally going from one store to another. Models of simultaneous search conjure up an image of a consumer sitting at home and calling up a sample of stores. In the case of internet search, a more relevant image is of a process that takes the form of a query. When the consumer browses for a substitute to his outside option, he submits a query through a search engine. For instance, he may enter keywords which represent features that the potential substitute might share with the outside option. The set fx 2 M j xRsg thus consists of the relevant matches that the consumer's query elicits. A higher number of keywords corresponds to a thinner R and implies a narrower, more focused search. This means that the search will be less costly, but it also means that the consumer is more likely to miss relevant matches.
Bearing in mind this search-based interpretation, consider the following two-stage variant on the competition-in-menus model of Section 3. In stage 1, …rms choose menus just as in our model, and consumers simultaneously choose a search intensity level l 2 f1; :::; Lg. Each search intensity l corresponds to some consideration relation R l , such that a higher l corresponds to a richer R l , and L corresponds to the rationalconsumer case (yR L x for all x; y 2 X). Search cost increases with its intensity. In stage 2, consumers choose according to our procedure, given the R they e¤ectively chose in stage 1.
It is easy to show that if search costs are su¢ ciently high, consumers choose the lowest possible search intensity l = 1 in equilibrium, and so the search-theoretic model is trivially reduced to our model with a consideration relation R 1 . Conversely, as search costs tend to zero, consumers necessarily choose l = L with positive probability in stage 1. However, this probability is strictly below one. To see why, assume the contrary. Then, consumers choose rationally as if there were no search costs. Firms'best-reply must be to play f1g with probability one. But if this is the case, then it is optimal for consumers to choose l = 1 rather than l = L, a contradiction. This result means that when search costs are small, the search-theoretic model is consistent with the extended competition-in-menus model with heterogeneous consumers discussed in the previous sub-section, where the distribution of R is derived from the consumers'…rst-stage mixed equilibrium strategy. The result also means that the …rms'equilibrium payo¤ is necessarily above the competitive level. The reason is that in equilibrium, consumers choose the maximal search intensity with positive probability, and therefore if a …rm plays f1g, it generates a market share above 1 2 . This result is somewhat surprising: lower search costs lead to higher industry pro…ts.
It should be emphasized that although the methodology embodied in this search model is standard, the actual model is unconventional both in its search technology and in the e¤ect that the consumer's sample is in ‡uenced by irrelevant alternatives. However, these aspects make the model suited for analyzing internet search. In particular, the use of irrelevant alternatives can be viewed as an instance of the branch of internet marketing known as "search engine optimization", which is concerned with …rms'strategic reaction to the way consumers employ search engines. Developing an internet search model based on our consideration-sets formalism is left for future work. 
Appendix: Proofs
All the proofs in the Appendix pertain to results stated in Section 3. Note that they make use of Lemma 1, the proof of which was given in the main text. In what follows, denotes a symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy.
Proof of Remark 1
Let us begin with two observations. First, note that R violates the necessary and suf…cient condition for a competitive equilibrium outcome given by proposition 1. Therefore, (x) > 0 for some x 6 = 1. Second, any menu in S( ) is either a singleton or a menu of the form fx; ng, where x 6 = n. Otherwise, it is pro…table to substitute any irrelevant alternative with n, thus saving menu costs without damaging market share. Our next step is to show that f1g 2 S( ). By Lemma 1, if f1g = 2 S( ), then f1; ng 2 S( ). It follows that f1; ng beats any other menu M 2 S( ). Among these menus M , let M be a menu with a -minimal b(M ). If a …rm deviates from M to f1; ng, it increases its market share by 1 2 f1; ng+ 1 2 (1 f1; ng) = 1 2 > cf1; ng c(M g, hence the deviation is pro…table. Therefore, f1g 2 S( ). In particular, this means that …rms earn a competitive payo¤, because the menu f1g generates a market share of 1 2 . Next, let us show that fng 2 S( ). The menu M de…ned in the previous paragraph does not beat any other menu in S( ), because b(M ) b(M ) for all M 2 S( ). Note that M must be a singleton, because an irrelevant alternative would be costly to add yet it would generate no added market share. If M 6 = fng, then a …rm can pro…tably deviate from M to fng, thereby saving menu costs without changing its market share.
The key step in the proof is to show that S( ) contains exactly one menu of the form fx; ng, with x = 1. Assume that fx; ng 2 S( ) for some x 6 = 1; n. From the …rms' decision to include n in this menu as part of a best-reply to , we conclude that c 1 , contradicting a previous step. Now suppose that f1; ng = 2 S( ). We have already established that fng 2 S( ). But if S( ) contains no menu of the form fx; ng with x 6 = n, the menu fng generates a payo¤ of The proof of Proposition 6 is preceded by a pair of lemmas concerning symmetric equilibria under re ‡exive consideration relations.
Lemma 2 Suppose that R is re ‡exive. Then, (x) 2c x for all x 6 = 1.
Proof. Assume the contrary. Let x be the -minimal product for which In order for this deviation to be unpro…table, we must have 
(z)
c z for all z x. Adding up these inequalities, we obtain , we obtain (1). In order for this deviation to be unpro…table, we must have (1) 2c 1 . Combined with Lemma 2, we obtain P x (x) 2c(X). Since the L.H.S is equal to one, we obtain a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 6
Let us …rst introduce three pieces of notation. …rst, recall the de…nition M = fM 2 S( ) j b(M ) = 1g. Second, for every M 2 M, de…ne B(M ) as the set of products z 6 = 1 for which (z) > 0 and yRz for some y 2 M n f1g. Second, de…ne (M ) P z2B(M ) (z) 2 P y2M c y . Assume that …rms earn a payo¤ above 
Proof of Proposition 7
Because identity is an equivalence relation, Proposition 6 implies that …rms earn competitive payo¤s in symmetric Nash equilibrium. Observe that under the identity consideration relation, M beats c x , which is above the competitive level, a contradiction. Therefore, (x) > 0 for all x 6 = 1. Let M 2 S( ) be a menu that includes some x 6 = 1 as a non-maximal product. Since the identity relation is re ‡exive, Lemma 2 implies (x) 2c x . If the inequality is strict, it is pro…table for a …rm to deviate from M to M nfxg. It follows that (x) = 2c x . But this means that any menu M 2 S( ) with b(M ) = x, x 6 = 1, yields the same payo¤ against as the singleton fxg. Therefore, The two results that characterize symmetric equilibria when menu costs are small rely on the following lemma. it is pro…table to deviate from M l to X -and the result follows immediately. Now suppose that each of these menus M l beats some other menu in S( ). Then, for any l 2 f1; :::; Lg, it must be the case that P x6 =1;yRx for no y2M l (x) 2(c(X) c(M l )) -otherwise, it is pro…table to deviate from M l to X. In addition, it must be the case that (M l ) + P x6 =1;yRx for some y2M l (x) 2c(M l ) -otherwise, it is pro…table to deviate from one of the menus that M l beats into M l itself. Summing over these inequalities, we obtain (M l ) + P x6 =1 (x) 2c(X)(c(X) c(M l )), which immediately implies the result.
Proof of Proposition 8
Assume c 1 < 1=(2 n + 2n). Suppose that S( ) contains a menu M such that 1Rb(M ).
Then, 1 2 (1) c 1 -otherwise, it is pro…table for a …rm to deviate from M to f1g. Combined with Lemma 4, we obtain the inequality P x=1;:::;n (x) 2(c(X) + c 1 ) < 2(n + 1)c 1 . Note that the L.H.S of this inequality is by de…nition equal to one. Therefore, we obtain the inequality c 1 > 1=2(n + 1), which contradicts our assumption on c 1 for any n 2.
Now suppose that (x) = 0 for all 1Rx, x 6 = 1. Note that S( ) contains at most c 1 against , which concludes the proof. Thus, assume f1g = 2 S( ). Then, each M 2 S( ) with b(M ) = 1 must beat some other M 0 2 S( ). Moreover, it must be the case that (M ) 2c 1 -otherwise, it is pro…table to deviate from M 0 to f1g. Summing over all these menus M , we obtain (1) 2 n c 1 . Combined with Lemma 4, we obtain 1 2c(X) + 2 n c 1 < (2 n + 2n)c 1 , a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 9
This is an immediate corollary of Lemma 4.
